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People construct ad hoc categories to achieve goals. For example, constructing the cate-
gory of "things to sell at a garage sale" can be instrumental to achieving the goal of selling
unwanted possessions. These categories differ from common categories (e.g., "fruit," "fur-
niture") in that ad hoc categories violate the correlational structure of the environment and
are not well established in memory. Regarding the latter property, the category concepts,
concept-to-instance associations, and instance-to-concept associations structuring ad hoc cate-
gories are shown to be much less established in memory than those of common categories.
Regardless of these differences, however, ad hoc categories possess graded structures [i.e.,
typicality gradients) as salient as those structuring common categories. This appears to be
the result of a similarity comparison process that imposes graded structure on any category
regardless of type.
The study of natural categories has been limited
mostly to common categories such as "birds," "furni-
ture," and "fruit." However, the use of highly specialized
and unusual sets of items pervades everyday living. Some
examples are "things to take on a camping trip," "pos-
sible costumes to wear to a Halloween party:' and
"places to look for antique desks." Since categories like
these often appear to be created spontaneously for use
in specialized contexts, I refer to them as ad hoc cate-
gories. Theories of natural categories primarily reflect
what we have learned from common categories. By
further considering ad hoc categories, we may discover
a more general theory of categorization for which
common and ad hoc categories are special cases.
This introduction first addresses two central proper-
ties of common categories: graded structure and well
established category representation in memory. A
comparison-network model is then proposed that
accounts for these properties in common categories.
The following section shows how this general model can
also account for related predictions in ad hoc categories.
Before going on to four experiments that address these
predictions, an additional theoretical difference between
ad hoc and common categories, the degree to which
they reflect correlational structure, receives brief dis-
cussion.
Central Properties of Common Categories
Graded structure. As noted by Mervis and Rosch
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(1981) and Smith and Medin (1981), the discovery of
graded structure has had a major impact on theories
of categorization. Graded structure has three aspects.
First, some instances are better examples of a category
than are others; "chair" is a more typical example of
"furniture" than is "bookcase." This aspect of graded
structure has been found in all common categories
investigated so far. Rosch (1973, 1975b) found typi-
cality in color categories (e.g., red, green). Rips, Shoben,
and Smith (1973) and Rosch (1973, 1975a) found
typicality in common semantic categories (e.g., fruit,
clothing). Rosch and Mervis (1975), Rosch, Simpson,
and Miller (1976), Smith, Shoben, and Rips (1974),
and Tversky (1977) have since argued that the typicality
of a category member increases as it becomes more
similar to other category members. The second aspect
of graded structure is the presence of unclear cases,
items whose category membership is uncertain
(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978); people are not sure
whether "radio" belongs to the category of "furniture."
The third aspect of graded structure is that the non-
members of a category (i.e., its complement) vary in
how similar they are to the concept of the category;
"typewriter" is more similar to the concept of "stereo
equipment" than is "dog." This aspect has commonly
been cited as the reason some false items take longer to
reject in the category verification task than do others
(McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1979; Smith et al., 1974);
"bat" takes longer to reject as a member of "birds"
than does "chair." No evidence bears on whether such
similarity gradients cause subjects to reliably rate non-
members of a category for typicality within the comple-
ment of the category. But, given the strong relation
between judged typicality and category verification for
category members, reliable judgments of typicality for
nonmembers as well would not be surprising. In sum-
mary, graded structure is a continuum of category
membership, ranging from prototypical members through
211 Copyright 1983 Psychonomic Society, Inc.
212 BARSALOU
unclear cases to prototypical nonmembers (cf. Zadeh,
1965).
Well established category representation. The second
property of common categories this paper focuses on is
their possession of well established category represen-
tations. Organization of information to be remembered
is clearly central to recall performance (Bousfield,
1953; Mandler, 1967; Tulving, 1962) and is also impor-
tant to recognition performance (Mandler, Pearlstone, &
Kooprnans, 1969). Taxonomic organization, almost
exclusively employing common categories, has been one
of the primary types of organization to receive atten-
tion. That taxonomically organized lists are better
recalled than lists of unrelated words has been demon-
strated on numerous occasions (e.g., Bower, Clark,
Lesgold, & Winzenz, 1969; Cofer, 1967; Puff, 1970).
Such organization also results in clustering during recall
(e.g., Bousfield, 1953; Bousfield & Cohen, 1953). Most
investigators have viewed the effects of taxonomic
organization as reflecting the existence of preexperi-
mental structure in memory. Words from common
categories are easily organized during encoding because
memory structures for these categories assimilate pre-
sented information. Retrieval is facilitated during testing
because these structures provide a network for locating
presented information. When such organization does
not exist (e.g., for a list of unrelated words), subjects
have more difficulty organizing and retrieving a list
because (1) subjects have less relevant structure to begin
with, and (2) the structures used may be created during
learning and therefore not be well established. Further
evidence of well established category representations for
common categories comes from the free association
literature. The highest associates of many words are
often the names of common superordinate categories
and the names of common contrast categories (e.g.,
"chair" as a cue often produces "furniture" and "table,"
respectively). Superordinates and contrast categories are
high associates presumably because well established
memory structure interrelates these categories.
A Comparison-Network Model
This model, which accounts for graded structures
and well established category representations in common
categories, contains two interrelated components: a
similarity comparison process and a spreading activation
network.
The similarity comparison process. This process
computes the similarity of two concepts in working
memory. Generally, I will assume that similarity is some
function of the concepts' properties, and specifically,
I will assume that this function is along the lines of
Tversky's (1977) contrast model. Tversky's account
states that two concepts become more similar as the
number of properties shared by them increases and
the number of distinctive (i.e., nonshared) properties
decreases. His model also allows for weighting the
importance of properties and the importance of com-
mon vs. distinctive property sets (cf. Ortony, 1979).
Graded structure in a category results from com-
puting how similar the concepts for instances, unclear
cases, and noninstances are to the concept for the
category. The properties in a category concept are those
occurring most often for category instances and least
often for noninstances (see probabilistic concepts in
Smith & Medin, 1981). The central assumptions are:
(1) as instances become more similar to a category
concept, they become more typical of the category;
(2) as noninstances become less similar to a category
concept, they become more typical of the category's
complement; and (3) the similarity of unclear cases to
a category concept is close to the minimum amount
necessary for category membership.
Rosch and Mervis (1975) report data for common
categories consistent with this model. They found that
the more similar an instance is to all other category
members (i.e., its family resemblance), the more typical
it is of the category. Assuming that a category concept
is the average (in some sense) of all category members,
how similar an instance is to the category concept
should be at least highly correlated with (if not the same
as) how similar the instance is to all other instances.
So, the fmding that typicality correlates highly with
family resemblance is consistent with typicality depend-
ing on how similar category instances are to their cate-
gory concept.
The spreading activation network. This network
represents concepts and properties as nodes and repre-
sents associations between concepts and properties as
pathways that carry spreading activation. A more com-
plex but very similar network model can be found in
Collins and Loftus (1975). Loftus (1975) and Rosch
(1975c) provide additional comments of interest to this
discussion. In the model I am proposing, each concept
is associated to properties characteristic of the concept's
referents in the environment. In addition, properties can
be associated to each other and concepts can be associ-
ated to each other. Associations have labels such as
"has" (e.g., a robin has wings), "cooccurs" (e.g., "gills"
cooccurs with "swims"), and "is an instance of' (e.g.,
"robin" is an instance of "bird"). Strength of association
is free to vary continuously and increases as a function
of how frequently and recently an association has been
active in working memory. Associations can also be
asymmetrical; that is, the strength of association from
Node X to Node Y may not be the same as the strength
from Node Y to Node X. Although activation arrives at
the terminal nodes of both weak and strong associations
equally fast (Lorch, 1982; Ratcliff & McKoon, 1981),
greater activation accumulates at the terminal nodes of
strong associations than of weak ones in a fixed time
period. A node is active in working memory when the
total amount of activation arriving at it is above some
threshold value. When a node becomes active, there is
competition for activation among associations leaving
it (i.e., the fan effect; Anderson & Bower, 1973) only
for weak associations. As found by Hayes-Roth (1977),
well learned associations do not compete with each
other for activation.
This network model accounts for the well established
category representations of common categories in three
ways: Common categories have well established concept-
to-instance associations, well established instance-to-
concept associations, and well established category
concepts. AIl are well established because of frequent
and recent processing in working memory. The perfor-
mance implications of each type of structure are dis-
cussed in turn.
(1) Strong concept-to-instance associations in com-
mon categories enable category concepts to easily acti-
vate category instances. Such top-down associations are
useful when one is trying to generate category members
during category production tasks or trying to recall
information from a categorized list. For example,
activating "furniture" might activate "chair," "table,"
"desk," and so on. In addition, Barsalou (1981) and
Mervis, Catlin, and Rosch (1976) report that typical
instances generally have stronger concept-to-instance
associations than atypical instances.
(2) Strong instance-to-concept associations in com-
mon categories enable instances to activate their cate-
gory concepts. Such bottom-up associations are useful
for categorizing single instances and for organizing
multiple instances of the same category. For example,
perceiving the words "oak," "maple," and "pine" all
activate "tree," which can be used for the purposes of
categorization and organization.
(3) The category concepts for common categories
are well established in memory because the associations
between a concept and its properties and between the
properties themselves are well established. For example,
"bird" is highly associated to "wings," "flies," "feathers."
and so on, which are highly associated among them-
selves. To the extent a category concept is weIl estab-
lished, it should be easier to locate in memory. This
follows from the assumption that weIl established con-
cepts are more "visible" to a memory scanning mech-
anism or from the assumption that weIl established
concepts have more pathways into them from other
information in memory.
The similarity comparison process interfaces with
the network in that concepts entering the comparison
process are concept-property node sets activated above
threshold. FoIlowing Barsalou (1982), only a subset of
a concept's properties is usually active. This active subset
may contain (1) context-independent properties that
are active on all occasions the concept is processed, and
(2) context-dependent properties that are activated only
by relevant contexts. For example, "basketball" may
activate "round" on all occasions, but it may activate
"floats" only in contexts involving bodies of water.
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Ad Hoc Categories and the
Comparison-Network Model
The comparison-network model is sufficiently general
to make predictions for ad hoc categories as weIl as to
explain the previous findings for common categories.
Predictions regarding graded structure and category
representation in ad hoc categories are addressed in
turn.
Graded structure. The comparison-network model
predicts that ad hoc categories should exhibit graded
structure. If graded structure results from concepts
bearing different amounts of similarity to a category
concept and if concepts vary in similarity from the
category concepts of ad hoc categories (a safe assump-
tion), then ad hoc categories should exhibit graded
structure. In contrast, it is possible that ad hoc cate-
gories may not be processed in the same way as common
categories. Instead, they may be processed as true
equivalence classes upon which the similarity compari-
son process does not operate. Ad hoc categories may be
represented more as lists without internal structure than
as categories possessing typicality gradients. Experi-
ment I addresses whether ad hoc categories can possess
graded structure.
As proposed in the next section, an important differ-
ence between ad hoc and common categories is that
ad hoc categories do not have well established category
representations in memory. However, it is hard to see
how this difference would affect the similarity compari-
son process, assuming this process is found to generate
graded structure in ad hoc categories. Experiments 2a
and 2b address whether the graded structures of poorly
established categories (e.g., ad hoc categories) differ
from those of well established categories (e.g., common
categories ).
Category representation. A central difference be-
tween COmmon and ad hoc categories appears to be
that common categories have well established category
representations in memory, whereas ad hoc categories
do not. Ad hoc categories are not wen established simply
because people rarely, if ever, think of them. This pre-
cludes the development and strengthening of associa-
tions between the nodes representing them. Besides
observing whether lack of established category repre-
sentation eliminates graded structure in ad hoc cate-
gories (as just discussed), the experiments to follow
explore three ways that this lack of structure may cause
the processing of ad hoc categories to differ from the
processing of common categories.
The first way lack of category representation may
affect the processing of ad hoc categories centers on
concept-to-instance associations. These associations
enable a category concept to act as a cue to activate
category instances during category production and
recall. Unlike common categories, ad hoc categories may
not have direct associations from their category con-
cepts to their instances. If so, retrieving instances from
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ad hoc categories should be more difficult than retriev-
ing instances from common categories. Experiments 2a
and 3 explore this prediction.
The second way lack of category representation may
affect the processing of ad hoc categories centers on
instance-to-concept associations. These associations
enable people to activate categories to which an instance
belongs. Unlike common categories, ad hoc categories
may not have direct associations from their instances to
their category concepts. If so, categorizing instances into
ad hoc categories should be more difficult than cate-
gorizing them into common categories. Experiment 4
explores this prediction.
The third way lack of category representation may
affect the processing of ad hoc categories centers on how
well established their category concepts are. Unlike
common categories, the properties composing ad hoc
category concepts may not be well associated, since
these properties have rarely, if ever, been processed
simultaneously. If so, the category concepts of ad hoc
categories should not be as accessible as those of com-
mon categories. Experiment 3 explores this prediction.
The Relation of Ad Hoc and Common
Categories to Correlational Structure
An important difference between ad hoc and com-
mon categories not addressed empirically in this paper,
but certainly worthy of future attention, centers on the
correlational structure of the environment. As Rosch,
Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) have
noted, properties of entities in the environment are not
independent but, instead, form clusters of correlated
properties. For example, if an entity has feathers, there
is a much higher probability that it flies and builds
nests than that it swims and has gills. Entities instantiat-
ing a set of correlated properties are very similar to each
other and are very different from entities instantiating
other sets of correlated properties. For example, differ-
ent kinds of birds are very similar to each other and are
very different from members of fish and vehicles.
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976)
show that people are sensitive to the correlational
structure of the environment and that they prefer to use
categories that take maximal advantage of it.
What I have been referring to as common categories
appear to reflect correlatonal structure. They circum-
scribe sets of entities that share many correlated prop-
erties and that do not share many properties with mem-
bers of other categories (Rosch & Mervis, 1975). We
readily perceive these sets as categories because they
have so much in common (although, as Rosch and
Mervis show, no property or correlation of properties
need be true of all a category's members).
In contrast, ad hoc categories appear to violate the
correlational structure of the environment. Consider the
category of "things to take from one's home during a
fire," which contains members as diverse as "children,"
"dog," "stereo," and "blanket." This category's instances
do not appear to share correlated properties. More-
over, its instances share many correlated properties with
entities in the complement of the category. For exam-
ple, "dog" also belongs to the common category of
"mammals," many of which belong to the complement
of "things to take from one's home during a fire."
If ad hoc categories cut across the correlational
structure of the environment, then why do people per-
ceive them as categories? Most likely, this is because
ad hoc categories are instrumental to achievinggoals. For
example, someone trying to escape a burning home and
minimize loss might try to construct the category of
"things to take from one's home during a fire" before
heading for safety. Similarly, someone interested in tak-
ing a trip would need to consider "things to pack in a suit-
case." To the extent that someone is achieving either of
these goals for the first time, the corresponding cate-
gories should not have well established category represen-
tations in memory. As noted in the general discussion,
however, frequently used ad hoc categories may develop
well established category representations much like
those of common categories.
Before proceeding to experiments that address graded
structure and category representation in ad hoc cate-
gories, it is necessary to comment on the sampling of
ad hoc categories. Ad hoc categories will be defined for
the purpose of this paper as sets that (1) violate corre-
lational structure and (2) are usually not thought of by
most people. Clearly, there are an indefinitely large
number of such categories, and it would probably be
impossible to enumerate them all. At this point, it is
even difficult to imagine what kinds of ad hoc categories
exist. For this reason, these experiments do not attempt
to draw conclusions about all ad hoc categories but
concentrate instead on the nature of a few of them.
Although these experiments can primarily be interpreted
with respect to existential as opposed to universal
claims, they provide constraints on a general theory of
categorization. Finding that some uncommon cate-
gories exhibit graded structure forces a general theory
to include a mechanism that can generate such structure
in a wider range of categories. Finding that categories
vary in how well established they are forces a general
theory to include mechanisms that account for this
difference. And finding that graded structures occur in
poorly established categories further constrains the
mechanism responsible for generating graded structure.
EXPERIMENT 1
Rather than possessing graded structure, ad hoc
categories may be represented as unordered lists in
which all instances are equally good members. Alterna-
tively, the same similarity comparison process that
generates graded structure for common categories may
also operate during the processing of ad hoc categories.
This experiment and the next investigate whether ad hoc
categories possess graded structure. Do subjects reliably
perceive typicality gradients in these categories? Are
subjects uncertain regarding the membership of certain
instances, namely, unclear cases? And do subjects
reliably perceive some nonmembers to be more typical
nonmembers than others?
Method
Design. Subjects performed two categorizing operations on
eight sets of six items. For each set, they were asked first to
separate out those items that belonged to some category and,
second, to rank order all six items for how good a member each
was of that category.
Materials. Each subject received a booklet containing instruc-
tions followed by eight pages of category materials, one for each
category. Each page contained a context vignette, the name of
an ad hoc category, and six randomly ordered labels in a column,
some of these denoting instances of the category. The categories
were "things to inventory at a department store," "ways to
make friends," "things that conquerors take as plunder,"
"nouns," "ways to escape being killed by the Mafia," "things
that babies do," "times to write a term paper," and "things
that could fall on your head."
Each context vignette described a person engaged in an
activity. The category label that followed denoted a category
relevant to the person's goals. The vignettes were used to estab-
lish the ad hoc categories in goal contexts. For each of four item
sets, three items were obviously from the a priori category and
the other three were not. For each of the other four sets, two
items were obviously from the a priori category, two were not,
and the remaining two were, intuitively, unclear cases. Table I
contains examples of the contexts and item sets.
The instruction sheet directed subjects to read both the
vignette and the category label, to look through the six items
that followed, and to circle those belonging to the category;
there was no constraint on the number they could circle. Next,
they were to rank all six items from the best example of the
category to the worst, with no ties.
Subjects and Procedure. Twelve undergraduates participated
for either course credit or pay. Half received one randomized
version of the list, and the other half received a different ran-
domized version. Subjects worked through the booklets at their
own pace and had as much time as necessary to complete the
experiment.
Results
Unclear cases. Agreement for category membership
for a given item in an item set was determined as fol-
lows. If a subject had circled an item, it was scored as
+1; if the subject had not, it was scored as -1. The
scores for the item were then summed across subjects. If
all 12 subjects circled the item, it received a score of
+12; if no subject circled the item, it received a score of
- I 2; if half the subjects circled the item, it received a
score of O. The absolute value of the score was divided
by 12. This measure ranged from 0 to 1, 0 indicating
no agreement (for an unclear case) and I indicating
complete agreement. The absolute value was taken to
measure agreement for nonmembers as well as for memo
bers of the category. The overall agreement for an item
set was simply the average of the agreement scores for
the six items in that set.
It should be noted that the average number of items
circled per item set was 3.15, with subjects circling
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Table I
Examples of Materials Used in Experiments I and 4
AD HOC CATEGORIES
Ways to Make Friends
Martin had moved from the midwest to the west coast over a
year ago. He had encountered much trouble making friends
since he had arrived in California and could not think of anyone
he presently considered a good friend. He decided it was time to
do something about it.
Experiment I Item Set
join a card playing club
get convicted for murder
don't take a bath more often than once a month
go back to school
have a garage sale
get convicted for burglary
Experiment 4 Item Set
get involved in local politics
get rich
have a garage sale
go to school
Ways to Escape Being Killed by the Mafia
Roy was in big trouble. The Mafia had a contract out on
him for double-crossing them. He knew he couldn't continue
living in Las Vegas or he'd be dead in a week. So he started
thinking quickly about alternatives.
Experiment I Item Set
change your identity and move to the
mountains of South America
move to the remote reaches of Wyoming*
stay where you're presently living in Las Vegas
move to Reno*
move to the mountains of Mexico
change where you're living in Las Vegas
Experiment 4 Item Set
move to the remote reaches of Wyoming
sail around the world
go to Mexico
become a drunk in Detroit
COMMON CATEGORIES
Fruit
Dan thoroughly enjoyed food. His favorite time of the year
was summer because of the abundance of fresh food that was
available.
Experiment 4 Item Set
apple
orange
banana
peach
RANDOMCATEGORIES
Horace was designing a computer system that would operate
the traffic signal system in a major urban area. He had to find a
competent group of programmers to help him do the program-
ming for the system.
Experiment 4 Item Set
blue
erase
riddle
monkey
Note-Only ad hoc categories were used in Experiment 1. The
c.ategory labels were not presented in Experiment 4.
"Unclear case.
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3 items 70% of the time and circling 2-4 items 95% of
the time. It can be easily shown that the overall agree-
ment score should be .04 if subjects were guessing and
had circled 3.15 items on the average.'
The mean agreement across item sets for this analysis
was .88. The average agreement for item sets not having
unclear cases was .97, compared to .79 for item sets
with unclear cases (Mann-Whitney U =0, p =.014).
An analysis of the item sets having unclear cases showed
that lower agreement for these sets was entirely the
result of poor agreement for five of the eight a priori
unclear cases; the average for these five items was .17,
compared to .96 for all other items from these four sets.
This demonstrates the presence of unclear cases in
ad hoc categories; namely, subjects can be divided about
whether certain items are members of ad hoc categories.?
Graded structure. Agreement for graded structure was
determined by computing Kendall's coefficient of con-
cordance across the subjects by items matrix of rankings
for each item set. A transformation of this statistic
(Guilford & Fruchter, 1973) estimates how much a
given subject agrees with every other subject on the
average. It is an estimate of subject agreement and not
the stability of an item set's means. If ad hoc categories
do not possess salient graded structures, then subjects
should show no agreement, and this statistic should
approach O. To the extent there is a salient graded
structure perceived by all subjects, this statistic should
approach 1. Across categories, the average agreement
was .87. Subjects' high agreement demonstrates ad hoc
categories possess salient graded structure.
Agreement was also computed for clear category
members alone and for clear category nonmembers alone.
Average agreement was .54 for category members and
.37 for category nonmembers, revealing both internal
and external graded structure. Agreement for internal
structure was greater than for external structure in only
three of the eight item sets.
The presence of unclear cases did not affect subjects'
typicality rankings. The average agreement was .92 for
item sets having unclear cases and .88 for those without;
this difference was not significant (Mann-Whitney
U =4, P = .171). So, unclear cases led to less agreement
for category membership but not for typicality. Subjects
may agree on the graded structure underlying a category
but be uncertain where to draw the category boundary
along this continuum.
Discussion
Ad hoc categories can possess graded structure. Sub-
jects showed high agreement for overall graded structure
in general and for internal and external graded structure
in particular. Further evidence of graded structure in
ad hoc categories stems from the presence of unclear
cases. Excluding unclear cases, however, subjects were in
excellent agreement over which items were and were not
category members."
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 28
As shown by Experiment 1, ad hoc categories can
possess graded structure. But how do these structures
compare with those found in common categories? To
what extent might well established category represen-
tations in common categories cause their graded struc-
tures to differ from those of ad hoc categories?
As mentioned earlier, salient typicality gradients have
always been found in common categories. In addition,
common categories exhibit another form of graded
structure: When subjects generate instances to a category
name, instances vary in how frequently they are gene-
rated; some instances are better examples during genera-
tion than others. These two forms of graded structure,
typicality and production frequency, are well correlated
for common categories (Barsalou, 1981; Mervis et al.,
1976).
Experiments 2a and 2b compare these two forms of
graded structure for common and ad hoc categories.
Experiment 2a compares the distributions of responses
given to both category types during exemplar genera-
tion. In particular, are some ad hoc category instances
more dominant than others during generation, as is the
case for common categories? If so, are the most domi-
nant responses for ad hoc categories as dominant as the
most dominant responses for common categories?
Experiment 2b compares typicality gradients for the two
category types. In particular, do subjects agree as much
in their typicality judgments for ad hoc categories as
they do for common categories? Also, do ad hoc cate-
gory instances vary as much in typicality as common
category instances do? That is, are typicality gradients
in ad hoc categories as "steep" as those in common
categories?
The comparison-network model predicts that typi-
cality gradients, as indexed by typicality judgments,
should be very similar for ad hoc and common cate-
gories. This follows from the assumptions that (1) the
same similarity comparison process constructs graded
structure for both category types and (2) how well
established a category is in memory does not affect this
process. In contrast, the model predicts that subjects
should show less agreement when generating category
members for ad hoc than for common categories. This
follows from the assumption that common categories
have well established concept-to-instance associations to
their typical instances, whereas ad hoc categories do not.
Consequently, most subjects should access the typical
instances of the common categories and show high
agreement, whereas subjects' search of ad hoc categories
should be more random and, therefore, show less agree-
ment.
Method: Experiment 2a
Twenty subjects generated the first four exemplars that came
to mind for nine common and nine ad hoc categories. Half the
subjects received the 18 categories in one random order, and half
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Category Type
Note-N = number of subjects (of 20) generating an item.
Table 2
Effect of Category Type on Production Frequency Distribution:
Average Number of Items per Category (Experiment 2a)
Table 3
Average Proportion of SUbjects Producing the ith Most
Generated Item per Category (Experiment 2a)
Results: Experiment 2b
Ratings. For each of the 18 categories, the intraclass
correlation coefficient (Guilford & Fruchter, 1973)
was computed for the subjects by items matrix of rat-
ings. This coefficient can be interpreted as measuring
how much subjects agree on the typicality of a cate-
gory's exemplars. Specifically, the coefficient estimates
how much a given subject's ratings correlate with
another's on the average; it does not measure how stable
the mean for each item is. Its average value across cate-
gories within category types is shown in Table 4. Sub-
jects agreed equally well for both category types [t(16}
= .94, P > .20] .
The average level of typicality differed marginally for
common and ad hoc categories [t(16) =1.93, .1 0 >
p > .05; see Table 4]. The standard deviation of the
mean typicality ratings for each category's items was
computed, and there was no difference between cate-
gory types [t(16} =1.34, p > .20; see Table 4]. In fact,
the average standard deviation for the ad hoc categories
was slightly larger than that for the common categories.
This latter finding indicates that the range of typicality
values for items in common and ad hoc categories was
comparable. This also indicates that a difference in range
did not bias the comparison between intraclass correla-
tions for the two category types. If the ranges for one
category type had been less on the average, this could
have relatively reduced the correlations for that type.
Rankings, For each of the 18 categories, a transfor-
mation of Kendall's coefficient of concordance was
computed for the subjects by items matrix of rankings
(Guilford & Fruchter, 1973). This statistic, like the
intrac1ass correlation, can be interpreted as measuring how
much subjects agree on the typicality of a category's
exemplars. Unlike the intraclass correlation, Kendall's
Method: Experiment 2b
For each of the 18 categories in Experiment 2a, the exemplars
were rank ordered by production frequency (i.e., the number of
subjects, from I to 20, generating an item). Six exemplars were
then selected from each category, one from the highest level of
production frequency, one from the lowest level (always I),
and the remaining four from, as much as possible, equally spaced
intervals between the highest and lowest levels. Two versions of
the stimuli were constructed. Each had the 18 categories in a
different random order; within each version, the six exemplars
from the same category were in a different random order. The
six exemplars appeared in a column below their category label.
The instructions defined typicality and directed subjects to
judge the typicality of each exemplar with respect to its cate-
gory label. Twelve subjects rated the exemplars' typicality on a
scale from 1 to 7, where 1 referred to a most unusual exemplar
and 7 to one of the best. Twelve other subjects ranked the
exemplars for typicality; no ties were allowed. Six subjects in
each task received each of the two list versions. Subjects were
24 introductory psychology students participating to receive
course credit.
conclusion that exemplar production is more consistent
for common than for ad hoc categories. Ad hoc cate-
gories, however, clearly show graded structure in the
sense that some instances are more dominant than others.
Category Type
.84 .56
.69 .39
.46 .31
.36 .26
.27 .20
Common Ad Hoc
1
2
3
4
5
N Common Ad Hoc
1-5 15.77 34.00
6-10 2.56 2.21
11-15 .77 .77
16-20 1.21 .00
ith Most
Generated Item
Results: Experiment 2a
Within the 80 exemplars generated for each category,
the average number of different exemplars per category
was 20.33 for the common categories and 37.00 for the
ad hoc categories [t(16) =6.54, P < .001]. The distribu-
tions for average number of items per category as a
function of average number of subjects generating an
item are shown in Table 2. The functions for both the
common and ad hoc categories were generally decreas-
ing and negatively accelerated. However, there was an
increase in frequency for the common categories for
items generated by 16-20 subjects. Also, the function
for the ad hoc categories decreased more rapidly than
the function for the common categories. The average
proportion of subjects producing the ith most generated
item per category is shown in Table 3 (for i = 1-5).
For each of the five levels shown, the proportion is
higher for the common categories, this being significant
by a sign test (p < .05). These three results-the average
number of different items generated, the characteristics
of the frequency as a function of agreement distribu-
tions, and the proportion of subjects generating the five
most generated items-are all in agreement with the
received them in another. Subjects were introductory psy-
chology students participating to receive course credit. The
common categories were 9 of the 10 common categories used by
Rosch (1975a): "birds," "sports," "fruit," "weapons," "vege-
tables," "vehicles," "clothing," "furniture," and "tools." The
ad hoc categories were what intuitively appeared to be atypical
and infrequently used categories. Four of these were drawn from
the previous experiment: "ways to make friends," "ways to
escape being killed by the Mafia," "things that can fall on your
head," and "plunder taken by conquerors." The other five were
"things that can be walked upon," "things that can float,"
"things that are poisonous," "things that can attack something,"
and "things that have a smell."
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Table 4
Summary Data for Experiment 2b
Category Type
Measure Common Ad Hoc
Ratings
Intraclass Correlation .50 .56
Typicality 5.08 4.68
Within-Category SD 1.44 1.65
Rankings
Coefficient of Concordance .57 .54
Note-All measures are averaged across categories.
coefficient does not have the problem of possible
differences in range. This is because the standard devia-
tion of a subject's rankings within a set is constant. The
average value of this statistic across categories within
category types is shown in Table 4. Again, subjects
agreed equally well for both category types [t( 16) = .36,
p > .50].
Intenneasure correlations. The following six correla-
tions across item averages are all significant at the
a = .001 level. Typicality ratings correlated with typi-
cality rankings .89 for the common categories and .89
for the ad hoc categories. The ratings correlated with
production frequency (from Experiment 2a) .80 for the
common categories and .66 for the ad hoc categories;
the difference between these latter two correlations
approached significance (z = 1.55, p= .12). The rankings
correlated with production frequency .90 for the com-
mon categories and .65 for the ad hoc categories; the
difference between these two correlations was signifi-
cant (z = 3.45, p < .001). This difference suggests that
high- and low-typicality instances of common cate-
gories may differ more in how strongly they are assoc-
iated to their category concepts than do high- and low-
typicality instances of ad hoc categories.
Discussion
As predicted by the comparison-network model,
typicality gradients derived from typicality ratings and
rankings were equally salient for the ad hoc and com-
mon categories. This suggests, first, that subjects use the
same similarity comparison process to construct graded
structure for both category types and, second, that this
process is not affected by how well established a cate-
gory is in memory.
Similar to common categories, ad hoc categories also
showed graded structure as indexed by production
frequency. Some members of ad hoc categories are more
dominant during exemplar generation than others. As
predicted by the comparison-network model, however,
there was less consistency in exemplar production for
ad hoc than for common categories. This suggests that
the category types differ in the extent to which their
concept-to-instance associations are established in
memory. People have more experience with common
categories and, therefore, establish stronger associations
to these exemplars. Also, cultural forces may focus on
typical members such that these instances become
particularly well associated to their categories.
To provide further support for the claim that concept-
to-instance associations are better established in com-
mon categories than in ad hoc categories, additional
data were collected. Twelve new subjects generated
exemplars to the nine common categories and seven of
the ad hoc categories for a fixed time period (two
ad hoc categories, "ways to make friends" and "ways
to keep from being killed by the Mafia," could not be
used, since their exemplars are typically described by
more than one word). A tape recorder presented the
category names to the subjects intermixed in one of two
random orders. For 15 sec following the end of each
name, subjects wrote down as many category instances
as they could think of. Subjects generated 5.67 exemplars
on the average for the common categories and 4.22
exemplars for the ad hoc categories [t(14) = 5.58,
p < .001]. There was no overlap between the distribu-
tions of mean exemplars generated per category for the
two category types. Stronger concept-to-instance associ-
ations for common than for ad hoc categories enabled
faster access to the instances of common categories.
There is an alternative explanation for the differences
between ad hoc and common categories in production
consistency and access time: These ad hoc categories
may have contained more exemplars than the common
categories. Regarding consistency, there may simply
have been a lower probability of sampling an item from
an ad hoc than from a common category. With respect
to access time, greater numbers of exemplars may lead
to more interference and, therefore, slower access.
Although both familiarity and category size may affect
exemplar production, two of the present results provide
evidence for the familiarity explanation. (1) In Table 3,
the number of exemplars generated for common cate-
gories by 16-20 subjects was greater than the number
generated by 11-15 subjects. This could not be the result
of a difference in sampling probabilities, since the sam-
pling explanation predicts frequency to be a monotonic
decreasing function of the number of subjects. Rather,
this "bump" appears to be the result of familiarity with
the most prototypical exemplars. Notably, no such
bump occurs for the ad hoc categories. (2) The correla-
tions between typicality and production frequency were
higher for common than for ad hoc categories. This
suggests that the high- and low-typicality instances of
common categories differ more than those of common
categories in the strength of their concept-to-instance
associations. If so, then the high-typicality instances of
common categories may well have stronger concept-to-
instance associations than the high-typicality instances
of ad hoc categories. Experiments 3 and 4 provide
further evidence that common categories are much
better established in memory than are ad hoc categories.
It is of interest to note that robust typicality gradients
occurred in categories defmed by necessary and suf-
ficient conditions. Many of the ad hoc categories were of
the form "things that exhibit X," in which X was a
necessary and sufficient condition (e.g., things that have
a smell, things that can float). Thus, unequal category
membership exists even in well defined categories. This
could be the result of either of two factors. First, a
necessary and sufficient condition may be possessed by
exemplars to varying degrees, in different manners, or
with different frequencies. "Milk" and "coffee" vary in
degree of "smell"; "perfume" and "skunk" vary in man-
ner of "smell"; and "basketball" and "sailboat" vary in
frequency of "floats." Such differences in possession of
category criteria may be correlated with typicality.
Seocnd, irrelevant properties associated with a necessary
and sufficient condition may enter into typicality judg-
ments. The criteria for "medical doctor" are well defmed,
but someone possessing irrelevant properties of the
doctor-personality stereotype may be a better example
of "doctor" than someone who does not. Barsalou
(1981) offers direct evidence that these factors deter-
mine typicality in categories defined by necessary and
sufficient conditions.
EXPERIMENT 3
The production frequency results of Experiment 2a
suggest that concept-to-instance associations are better
established in memory for common than for ad hoc
categories. The current experiment tests this hypothesis
more directly and also tests the hypothesis that the
category concepts of common categories are better
established than are those of ad hoc categories. One
group of subjects received words from common cate-
gories, a second group received words from ad hoc
categories, and a third group received clusters of words
that were unrelated. For the common and ad hoc
category lists, a category's instances were grouped and
preceded by their category label. All subjects performed
a free recall of the words, and the common and ad hoc
subjects performed a subsequent cued recall.
Two measures of recall from categorized lists are of
interest (see Tulving & Pearlstone, 1966): (1) the num-
ber of categories accessed during recall (a category is
accessed if at least one of its exemplars is recalled),
and (2) the average number of exemplars retrieved per
accessed category. The predictions of the comparison-
network model are as follows.
Category access. If common categories have better
established category concepts than ad hoc categories,
then the category concepts for common categories
should be accessed more easily during free recall. This is
in accordance with the well known fact that high-
frequency responses are better recalled than are low-
frequency responses (Hall, 1954). It can be explained
by assuming that better established concepts are more
"visible" to a scanning process or have more pathways
into them from other information in memory. A con-
sequence of category concepts being better established
for common than for ad hoc categories is that it should
be easier to retrieve the exemplars of common cate-
gories during recall via their category concepts. Conse-
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quently, common categories should be accessed more
often than ad hoc categories. In addition, if ad hoc
categories are accessed no more frequently than random
categories, this would suggest that the concepts for
ad hoc categories are indeed not well established in
memory.
It should be noted that the exemplars of the common,
ad hoc, and random categories were made equally acces-
sible in this experiment by equating their word fre-
quency and imageabliity. Any differences observed in
category access, therefore, can be attributed to differ-
ences in how well established the category concepts are
for each category type, but not to differences in the
accessibility of their exemplars.
Exemplar retrieval. Two predictions follow from the
hypothesis that concept-to-instance associations are
better established for common than for ad hoc cate-
gories. First, more correct exemplars should be retrieved
from common than from ad hoc categories for accessed
categories. Second, there should be a higher intrusion
rate for common categories. Both predictions follow
from the assumption that stronger concept-to-instance
associations result in instances more likely being acti-
vated above threshold during retrieval. Increased avail-
ability of instances via these associations may also
facilitate organization at encoding.
Method
Design. Three groups of subjects each received 48 words
partitioned into 12 clusters of 4 words each. One group received
a list of common category exemplars blocked by category, a
second group received a list of ad hoc category exemplars blocked
by category, and a third group received a list of clusters contain-
ing unrelated words. Half the subjects for each category type
received the word sets in one random order, and half received
them in another. Within each order, the words for the same set
appeared in a different random order. Six subjects were nested
in each of the category type by order cells of the design.
All subjects performed a free recall of the list after it was
presented. Subjects in the common and ad hoc category condi-
tions were then given the category labels as cues for further
recall. (Random category subjects could not perform a cued
recall, since their list did not contain category labels.) In the
common and ad hoc category conditions, half the subjects in
each category type by order cell received the cues in one random
order, and half received them in another. Before learning the
critical lists, all subjects received and free recalled the same
practice list, which contained 36 unrelated words similar to
those in the critical lists.
Materials. The common categories, drawn from Battig and
Montague (1969) and Rosch (1975a), were "furniture," "cloth-
ing," "vehicles," "birds," "sports," "fruit," "vegetables,"
"insects," "trees," "animals," "musical instruments," and
"colors." The ad hoc categories, which seemed to be atypical
and infrequently used, were "where eating can occur," "can fall
on your head," "has a smell," "can be walked upon," "plunder
taken by conquerors," "can attack something," "can be used for
hitting," "manufactured by humans," "is poisonous," "can be
eaten," "is a liquid," and "can float." All the exemplars were
common single-word nouns. Exemplars from the common and
ad hoc categories were typical of their respective categories.
Those for "vegetables" were "potato," "corn," "celery," and
"spinach"; those for "manufactured by humans" were "tele-
phone," "helicopter," "camera," and "refrigerator"; those for
one of the random categories were "grease," "spider," "admiral,"
and "copper."
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The three lists were equated for Kucera and Francis (967)
frequency (21.96, 22.52, and 21.19 for the common, ad hoc,
and random categories, respectively; F < 1). To insure that the
stimulus sets were equivalent in imagery, 12 undergraduates
rated how easy it was to image the referent of each word in the
three lists. On a 1-7 scale, with 7 meaning highest imagery, the
average ratings were 5.42, 5.32, 5.44, for the common, ad hoc,
and random categories, respectively (F < 1).
Subjects and Procedure. The subjects, 36 undergraduates
participating to receive course credit, were told they would be
presented with two lists to learn for free recall. The practice
list was presented by a slide projector, one word at a time at a
2.5-sec rate, followed by a buffer task lasting 3 min. Subjects
were then asked to recall, for 5 min, as many words as possible
in any order from the list.
Subjects were then informed about the categorized list to
come. Subjects in the common and ad hoc category conditions
were told not to recall the category labels, but that these would
be useful in organizing and learning their list. Subjects in the
random category condition were told to learn each cluster of
four words as a group. All subjects were told about the format
of their list, which was then presented by a slide projector, one
item at a time at a 2.5-sec rate. For the common and ad hoc
category conditions, a category label was presented, followed by
the individual presentation of each exemplar. After presentation
of the fourth exemplar, the label of the next category was pre-
sented and followed by the individual presentation of its exem-
plars, this cycle continuing until all categories had been pre-
sented. For the random category list, a string of Xs appeared in
place of the category labels.
After working on a buffer task for 3 min, subjects attempted
to recall, for 5 min, as many exemplars as possible in any order
from the second list only; they did not recall the category
labels. Subjects in the common and ad hoc category conditions
were then given the category labels and again asked to recall,
for 5 min, as many words as possible in any order from the list.
Results
There are four dependent measures of interest. "Over-
all exemplar recall" refers to the proportion of 48 cate-
gory exemplars recalled by a subject. "Category access"
refers to the number of categories for which a subject
recalled at least one of the four exemplars. "Exemplars
per category recall" refers to the average number of
exemplars per category recalled by a subject (for only
those categories in which one or more exemplars were
recalled). "Intrusions" refers to the total number of
intrusions made by a subject.
For each measure, a two-way ANOVA was per-
formed on the free and cued recall data for the common
and ad hoc category subjects. Comparisons involvingthe
free recall data for the random category subjects were
computed from a one-way ANOVA performed across the
free recall data for all three category types. Except
where noted, each ANOVA was performed twice for
each dependent measure: once across subject averages
and once across item (i.e., category) averages. The
results from the subject and item analyses were then
combined to perform min F', planned comparisons of
interest (Clark, 1973). Analyses of the intrusion data
were performed on frequencies; all other analyses were
performed on proportions transformed using arcsins,
as suggested by Winer (1971). The subject means from
all analyses are shown in Table 5. There was no differ-
ence between the three list conditions on the practice
list [min F'(2,62) =1.60, P > .10] .
Overall exemplar recall. Common category subjects
recalled more exemplars than did ad hoc category sub-
jects during free recall [min F'(l,39) =16.72, r < .001]
and also during cued recall [min F'(1,39) =13.40,
P < .001]. Cued recall was superior to free recall both
for common category subjects [min F'(1,38) =14.70,
P<.001] and for ad hoc category subjects [min F'(l ,39)
= 18.18, P < .00l). There was no Recall Type by Cate-
gory Type interaction (min F' < 1). Random category
subjects recalled fewer exemplars during recall than
did common category subjects [min F'(1,64) =8.65,
P < .01]; the difference between random category
and ad hoc category subjects was not significant
[min F'(1,62) =1.16, p> .25], although it favored the
ad hoc category subjects.
Category access. Common category subjects accessed
more categories than did ad hoc category subjects during
free recall [min F'(1,36) =9.51, p < .01] . There was no
significant difference for cued recall [min F' (1,38) =
2.73, p > .10] , although it was in the same direction as
that for free recall. No difference was expected, since
providing cues should have equalized accessibility.
More categories were accessed during cued recall than
during free recall both for common category subjects
[min F'(1,36) = 15.14, P < .001] and ad hoc category
subjects [min F'(1,35) =28.29, p < .00l). There was no
Recall Type by Category Type interaction [min F'(l ,33)
=1.01, p > .25]. The difference between random cate-
gory subjects and common category subjects for free
recall approached significance [min F'(1,62) = 3.40,
.10> p > .05]. Notably, there was no difference
between random category subjects and ad hoc category
Table 5
Effects of Category Type on Free and Cued Recall (Experiment 3)
Category Type
Measure
Overall Proportion of Exemplars Recalled
Number of Accessed Categories (of 12)
Average Number of Exemplars/ Accessed Category (of 4)
Total Intrusions
Free Recall Cued Recall
Random Ad Hoc Common Ad Hoc Common
.33 .42 .58 .59 .73
7.33 7.33 9.42 10.75 11.75
2.15 2.72 2.94 2.59 2.96
1.08 .92 2.42 1.44 3.50
Note-All measures are the average per subject.
subjects (min F' < I). In fact, the number of categories
accessed was identical.
Exemplars per category recall. Common category
subjects retrieved more exemplars per accessed category
than did ad hoc category subjects, both during free
recall [min F'(l,37) =5.30, P < .05] and during cued
recall [min F'(l,42) =18.64, P < .001]. There was no
difference between cued recall and free recall for the
common category subjects (min F' < I) or for the
ad hoc category subjects [min F'(1,43) = 2.35, p > .10].
There was no Recall Type by Category Type interaction
[min F'(1 ,44) = 1.85, p > .10]. Random category sub-
jects during free recall retrieved fewer exemplars per
accessed category than did common category subjects
[min F(I,65) = 7.67, P < .01] and ad hoc category
subjects [min F'(1,65) =4.04, P < .05].
Intrusions. Common category subjects produced
more intrusions than did ad hoc category subjects, both
during free recall [min F'(1,43) =7.63, p<.OI] and
during cued recall [min F'(1,43) =14.72, P < .001].
The difference between cued recall and free recall was
marginally significant for common category subjects
[min F'(1,43) =3.98, .10 > P > .05], but not for ad hoc
category subjects (min F' < I). There was no Recall
Type by Category Type interaction (min F' < I). Intru-
sions did not differ during free recall between random
category subjects and common category subjects
[F(I ,33) =2.22, p > .10] or between random category
subjects and ad hoc category subjects (F < 1).4
Discussion
Overall, common category subjects recalled more
words than did ad hoc category subjects both for free
and cued recall. Decomposing overall recall into cate-
gory access and exemplar recall yielded similar results:
Common category subjects accessed more categories
than did ad hoc category subjects during free recall and
retrieved more exemplars per accessed category during
both free and cued recall. Common category subjects
also produced more intrusions during free and cued
recall than did ad hoc category subjects. All these find-
ings are consistent with the conclusion that ad hoc
categories are not as well established in memory as
common categories are. The concepts for common cate-
gories and their concept-to-instance associations are
better established in memory than are those for ad hoc
categories."
There is an alternative explanation for the difference
in accessibility between ad hoc and common categories.
Namely, the category labels were longer for the ad hoc
categories and, therefore, may have been more difficult
to retrieve. But if retention is related to length of cate-
gory label, then this relation should hold within each
category type. The correlation between number of
letters for each category label and probability of
accessing the category was computed separately for the
ad hoc and common categories. The correlations were
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.04 [t(IO) =.13, p > .50] and -.16 [t(10) =.52,
p> .50], respectively. Thus, label length does not
appear to have been a factor. Furthermore, subjects were
instructed not to recall the category labels, but only to
use them for organizing the word sets. This alternative
explanation has no bearing on exemplar recall, which
was computed only for accessed categories.
Ad hoc categories have some capability as mnemonic
devices. This was evidenced by ad hoc categories show-
ing greater exemplar recall per accessed category than
random categories. Although ad hoc categories are not
well, if at all, represented in memory, they are at least
able to provide organizational schemes for presented
information. The concepts for these categories, however,
were no more accessible than the representations of
random groups of words. In fact, the average numbers of
categories accessed for these two category types were
identical, 7.33 and 7.33.
EXPERIMENT 4
The previous two experiments show that category
concepts and concept-to-instance associations are better
established in common than in ad hoc categories. The
current experiment attempts to show that instance-to-
concept associations are better established for common
than for ad hoc categories. Subjects received sets of
exemplars to categorize. For example, ''What category
do moth, bee, gnat, and ant all belong to?" ''What
category do coffee, perfume, leather, and skunk all
belong to?,,6 Each set contained exemplars from a single
common category, exemplars from a single ad hoc cate-
gory, or unrelated items. Half the subjects received a
context vignette prior to each set that described a
character trying to achieve a goal. The category instanti-
ated by the exemplars was usually instrumental to
achieving the goal; that is, the context primed the cate-
gory. The remaining subjects received no such contexts.
All subjects tried to generate a category label for each
set and rated how easy it was to do so.
If instance-to-concept associations are not well
established for ad hoc categories, then subjects without
context should have difficulty labeling the ad hoc
category sets and should show much variability in the
labels they generate. This is because the ad hoc category
concepts should be difficult to activate, and subjects
may activate a wide range of concepts in the process
of trying to classify these sets. Difficulty should be
reduced, however, when these sets are preceded by
contexts that prime the category concepts. In contrast,
the common categories should be easy to label even
without context, since their instance-to-category associa-
tions are well established in memory. As each item in a
set is encoded, it should activate the same highly associ-
ated category concept. Consequently, subjects should
find it easy to categorize these sets and should show
much consistency in the labels they generate. It would
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not be surprising if the common category sets were as
easy to categorize without context as with it.
Method
Design. Subjects attempted to categorize 14 item sets. Eight
were from ad hoc categories, three were from common cate-
gories, and three, as best as possible, were from no category.
For each set, subjects provided (1) a label categorizing all four
items (if one could be discovered), (2) a rating of how easy it
was to find the label, and (3) a rating of how confident they were
that the label was appropriate.
Half the subjects received a context vignette before each
item set, and half received no specified context. For the ad hoc
and common categories, each contex t provided a relevant setting
for the category. The random categories bore no relation to their
contexts. Half the subjects received the ad hoc categories in one
random order, and half received them in the inverse order. For
all subjects, the common categories occurred at Positions I, 7,
and 10, and the random categories occurred at Positions 2, 5,
and 11. These categories provided subjects with examples of the
easiest and most difficult categories initially and intermittently
during the experiment; this allowed subjects to respond to the
ad hoc categories relative to the anchor points established by the
common and random categories.
Materials. Each subject received a booklet of instructions and
category materials. For the context condition, each page of
materials contained the context vignette, a blank line on which
to write a category label (if discovered), a column of randomly
ordered labels for the four exemplars, a response scale for indi-
cating ease of category discovery, and a response scale for
indicating how appropriate the label was for the four items.
The two response scales were the integers from I to 7, 7 repre-
senting maximum ease and appropriateness, respectively. For the
no-context condition, the category materials did not contain
the context vignettes, but they were otherwise identical to the
materials for the context condition.
The eight ad hoc categories were the same as those in Experi-
ment 1. The common categories were "fruit," "birds," and
"sports." The random categories were sets of items that intui-
tively did not constitute any category. Each context vignette
described a character engaged in a goal-directed activity and
primed the subsequent category. None of the vignettes contained
the category label for the respective item set. Table 1 contains
examples of the context and item sets.
Procedure and Subjects. Subjects in the context condition
were asked to read each vignette and to find, if they could, a
category to which all four items belonged. In the no-context
condition, subjects were instructed to study the four items and
to find a category to which all belonged. All subjects were told
that phrases, as well as single words, could serve as category
labels. They were also told that some item sets did not form a
category, and that if no category was apparent, they should
write "0" on the blank line above the items. Once they had
generated a label or given up, they were to choose values on the
ease and appropriateness scales.
The subjects, 24 undergraduates participating for either
course credit or pay, were randomly assigned, 6 each, to the
four context by order conditions. They worked through the
booklets at their own pace.
Results
Ratings of ease and appropriateness. For each mea-
sure, one ANOVA was performed on the ad hoc cate-
gories and another on the common and random cate-
gories together. Planned comparisons contrasted means
of interest between the two analyses. The results for the
ratings of ease and appropriateness were equivalent in
effects. Therefore, only the tests for ease will be
reported, although the means for both ratings are shown
in Table 6. As recommended by Clark (1973) and Winer
(1971), subjects and categories were both treated as ran-
dom effects in these analyses when appropriate. For the
ad hoc categories, subjects found it easier to discover
a category label with context then without [F'(l ,12) =
16.02, p<.OI]. There was a Context by Categories
interaction [F( 7,140) = 6.52, p < .001] : Some ad hoc
categories were more difficult to discover than others,
but less so with context than without. This interaction
occurs in all analyses for ad hoc categories reported here,
and its interpretation is the same in all cases.
Context had no effect on the ease of categorizing the
common and random categories [F'(l ,9) = 1.00] , and
there was no Context by Category Type interaction
(F ' < 1). However, common categories were much easier
than random categories [F'(l,140) = 308.39, p < .001).
Although position in the list was not controlled for the
common and random categories, varying this factor for
the ad hoc categories did not have an effect or interact
with context. This suggests that position was not a fact-
tor for the common and random categories as well, and
that the context and category type results are valid for
the common and random categories.
With context, the ad hoc categories were as easily
discovered as the common categories [min F'(l ,37) =
1.88, p > .101 and were more easily discovered than the
random categories [minF'(I,31)=123.27, p<.OOI)
Without context, the common categories were easier to
discover than the ad hoc categories [min F'(l ,25) =
10.32, P < .01], and the ad hoc categories were easier
than the random categories [min F'(l ,30) = 6.16, P <
.05).
Subjects' categorizations. Subjects generated labels
for the common categories 100% of the time. For the
ad hoc categories, they did so 97% of the time with
context and 83% of the time without. For the ran-
dom categories, they generated labels 14% of the time
with context and 31% of the time without. With so few
labels, the random categories were not considered in
the following analysis.
Table 6
Effects of Context and Category Type on Average Ratings of Category Discovery (Experiment 4)
Condition
Context
No Context
Random
1.31
1.97
Ease
Ad Hoc
6.33
4.29
Common
6.83
6.94
Random
1.31
1.89
Appropriateness
Ad Hoc
6.08
3.43
Common
6.72
6.83
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Note-See text for description of agreement measure.
Table 7
Effects of Context and Category Type on Agreement
for Category Labeling (Experiment 4)
How much did different subjects' labels for a given
item set denote the same category? For this analysis,
the 12 (or sometimes fewer) category labels generated
with context for each item set were typed in a ran-
dom order on a page, and those generated without con-
text for the same item set were typed on another. The
resulting 22 pages were randomly ordered, half the
booklets having the inverse order of the others.
Six judges were asked to group all the labels on a page
that denoted the same category for as many categories as
were perceived. To be grouped, two or more labels had
to be very similar conceptually, but they did not neces-
sarily have to share the same linguistic form. For each
category concept having two or more instantiations,
the judge wrote the category concept and indicated the
labels instantiating it.
A normalized measure of agreement, A, was com-
puted for each judge's analysis of the labels for each
item set in each context condition. A is defined as
[(number of category labels + I)-number of category
concepts1(number of category labels. "Number of cate-
gory concepts" equaled the number of concepts a judge
thought were instantiated by one or more labels for an
item set. A equaled 1 when all the labels were instantia-
tions of one and only one category concept. A equaled
l(number of category labels, at the lower bound, when
no category concept had more than one instantiation."
The means from these analyses are shown in Table 7.
For the ad hoc categories, agreement was greater with
context than without (.90 and .59, respectively)
[F'(1,9) = 16.08, P < .01] ; this corresponds to slightly
more than two concepts per set with context and
slightly less than six concepts without, for a set of 12
labels. There was also a Context by Categories interac-
tion [F(7,28) =7.44, P < .001] .
Surprisingly, for the common categories, there was
more agreement without context than with context; this
difference was marginally significant [F'(l ,6) = 5.28,
.10 > p > .05]. Subjects' labels with context were pri-
marily phrases relating the common category label, a
single word, to the relevant character or context (e.g.,
John's favorite fruit, birds Mike saw). In contrast, sub-
jects' labels without context were almost always the sin-
gle label for the category (e.g., fruit, birds). Subjects
in the context condition, by being more specific, were
more variable in their labelings.
The relation between category discovery and labeling.
Categories that were difficult to label were also the ones
that showed the least consistency in labeling. Ease of
--_.._-_.--_ ..
Discussion
These data support the conclusion that instance-to-
concept associations are better established in memory
for common than for ad hoc categories. Without con-
text, the ad hoc categories were difficult to identify, and
subjects were highly variable in the categories they dis-
covered. These category concepts only became obvious
and agreed upon in relevant contexts that primed the
concepts.
Because ad hoc categories are so specialized, it may
be optimal that perceiving an entity does not activate all
the ad hoc categories to which it belongs. Seeing a chair
and having categories such as "emergency firewood:' fits
in the trunk of a car ," and "used to prop doors open"
come to mind would be highly distracting when these
categories are irrelevant. Ad hoc categories should come
to mind only when primed by current goals. Such prim-
ing does occur, as found in this experiment.
In contrast to ad hoc categories, context had no
impact on ease of discovering common categories. The
concepts for these categories were as available without
context as they were with context. This shows that
instance-to-category associations are much better estab-
lished in memory for common than for ad hoc cate-
gories. Interestingly, subjects with relevant contexts
were more variable in their categorizations of common
category item sets than were subjects without relevant
contexts. It appears that the contexts caused subjects to
be more specific in these categorizations and that peo-
ple in general may often tailor common categories to
current contexts. That is, categories like "fruit," "furni-
ture ," and "clothing" may often be incorporated into
ad hoc categories relevant to current purposes (e.g., fruit
for dessert, furniture to be moved, clothing in the laun-
dry).
A given entity can be cross-classified into an indef-
initely large number of categories. For example, "apple"
can be cross-classified into "fruit," "things to take on a
picnic," "things that could fall on your head," and so
on. The data from the current experiment, in conjunc-
tion with Barsalou's (1982) distinction between context-
independent and context-dependent properties, suggest
the following account of cross-classification. During the
classification of an entity, categories with strong
instance-to-category associations may be automatically
activated. (e.g., "apple" may automatically activate
"fruit"). Alba, Chromiak, Hasher, and Attig (1980) and
Ross and Barsalou (note I) provide further evidence that
such automatic classifications exist. In contrast, cate-
gories weakly associated to an instance (e.g., "things to
take on a picnic" for "apple") may be activated only in
perceiving a category was positively correlated with how
well subjects agreed in labeling it. A correlated .94 with
ease and .92 with appropriateness (both significant at
the Q = .001 level). These correlations show that
increased difficulty in discovering a category led to
increased variability in subjects' categorizations.
.89
.98
Common
.90
.59
Ad HocCondition
Context
No Context
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contexts that require use of the category (e.g., going on
a picnic). These context-dependent categories are not
activated by the instance alone, but only by the con-
junction of the instance and a particular context. In gen-
eral, classifications highly associated to an instance are
available across all contexts, whereas weakly associated
classifications are only available in contexts that prime
them.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Categories other than the common taxonomic cate-
gories usually studied possess graded structure. More-
over, the ad hoc categories observed here had typicality
gradients as salient as those in common categories:
Ad hoc category instances varied as much in typicality as
common category instances, and subjects showed equal
agreement when judging typicality for both category
types. As suggested earlier, the same similarity compari-
son process appears to construct graded structure in
both common and ad hoc categories. Interestingly, this
process appears unaffected by how well established
a category is in memory.
Although the ad hoc and common categories were
similarly structured, they differed in category represen-
tation. First, strong concept-to-instance associations for
the common categories resulted in high consistency and
fast access during exemplar production and facilitated
the encoding and retrieval of relevant information pre-
sented for learning. Second, strong instance-to-concept
associations in common categories resulted in highly
available category concepts that facilitated categoriza-
tion. And third, well established category concepts in
common categories facilitated locating these categories
during memory search. In contrast, lack of strong
concept-to-instance associations for ad hoc categories
resulted in less consistent and slower instance retrieval
during exemplar production and made it harder to
remember relevant information presented for learning.
Lack of strong instance-to-concept associations in ad hoc
categories resulted in less available category concepts,
thereby making categorization difficult. And the cate-
gory concepts for ad hoc categories were so poorly estab-
lished that they were no more accessible than the
representations of random word groups. Although
ad hoc and common categories may be constructed by a
shared process that bestows the same graded structure
on each, other processes appear to result in the repre-
sentations of common categories becoming better estab-
lished in memory.
The Lossof Ad Hoc Status
Some ad hoc categories may be processed so fre-
quently that their category concepts, concept-to-
instance associations, and instance-to-concept associa-
tions all become well established in memory. At this
point, these categories are no longer ad hoc by the def-
inition I have been using. Even though they still violate
correlational structure, their representations in memory
are much more like those of common categories. Certain
ad hoc categories appear to make this transition. "Things
to sell at a garage sale" may start out as ad hoc for some-
one's first gargae sale but then become well established
with subsequent ones. Similarly, someone taking up
camping may have the category of "things to take on a
camping trip" shift from being ad hoc to well estab-
lished.
A phenomenon discovered by Alba et a1. (1980) can
be used to demonstrate this shift. These investigators
presented subjects with instances of common categories
ostensibly to learn for free recall. The number of
instances presented per category ranged from three to
nine. Immediately following presentation, subjects were
unexpectedly asked to estimate the number of instances
presented for each category (i.e., category frequency).
Across a wide range of instructions, list organizations,
and retrieval settings, subjects showed an unchanging
and excellent sensitivity for category frequency. Alba
et al attribute this to automatized instance-to-concept
associations: Every time an instance is encoded, it auto-
matically activates its category concept. Sensitivity to
category frequency results from a count being kept at
each category concept of how often it has been activated.
Ross and Barsalou (Note 1) performed a similar
experiment with ad hoc categories. They initially found
no sensitivity for category frequency, which they attrib-
ute to ad hoc categories not having strong instance-to-
concept associations. But if subjects repeatedly process
these categories for a week before the surprise frequency
test, strong instance-to-concept associations develop, and
equal sensitivity for ad hoc and common categories
results. What were once ad hoc categories are no longer
ad hoc.
Similar to the potential for ad hoc categories to
become well established in memory is the necessity of
common categories being poorly established in early
childhood. Horton (1982) demonstrated this by show-
ing that children's poor performance with common cate-
gories results at least in part from a lack of well estab-
lished memory structure. Children assessed as having
well established category representations did much bet-
ter on standard taxonomic tasks than children assessed
as having weak category representations.
As discussed earlier, ad hoc and common categories
differ in how well they reflect correlational structure.
Ross and Barsalou's (Note 1) category frequency results,
together with Horton's (1982) developmental find-
ings, demonstrate that how well a category reflects corre-
lational structure does not affect fundamental ways the
category is processed. Both ad hoc and common cate-
gories can behave as categories that are either poorly
established or well established in memory. It does not
appear that the differences between ad hoc and common
categories in Experiments 2a, 3, and 4 regarding estab-
lishment of category representation stem from how
well the two reflect correlational structure. Instead,
these differences most likely result from common
categories' having received much more processing prior
to the experiments than ad hoc categories. Furthermore,
Experiments 1 and 2b demonstrate that reflecting cor-
relational structure is not necessary for a category to
exhibit graded structure. In general, the same similarity
comparison and memory processes appear to operate on
categories that do and do not reflect correlational struc-
ture.
Determinants of Typicality
As discussed earlier for common categories, how
similar an instance is to all other category instances
(i.e., its family resemblance) determines its typicality.
The comparison-network model explains this relation-
ship by assuming that a category concept is the aver-
age of all category instances and that an instance's
typicality increases as it becomes more similar to the
category concept. This model goes on to explain typi-
cality in ad hoc categories in a similar manner; namely,
typicality depends on similarity to category concepts.
Missing from this account, however, are assumptions
regarding the content of category concepts for ad hoc
categories. Are they, too, averages of their category
instances? Barsalou (1981) provides evidence that they
are not. In two studies, family resemblance bore no
relation whatsoever to typicality for categories that
violate correlational structure. Instead, these cate-
gories are structured by dimensions relevant to the
goals the categories serve. For example, the dimensions
of "calories" structures "things not to eat on a diet,"
with the typicality of an instance increasing as its num-
ber of calories increases. This dimension is important,
presumably because it is relevant to the goal the cate-
gory serves, namely, losing weight.
The comparison-network model accounts for this
finding as follows. The category concept for an ad hoc
category does not contain the average properties of its
instances but, instead, only contains properties of the
instances relevant to the goal the category serves. Since
only "edible" and "high in calories" are relevant to
losing weight, all other properties in "things not to eat on
a diet" are not included in the category concept. During
typicality judgments, the primary way instances can vary
from this concept in similarity is simply with regard to
calories. Instances having few calories are not as similar
to the category concept as those high in calories and are
therefore less typical. Family resemblance does not
enter into typicality because the category concept does
not contain averages across all properties. All properties
except those relevant to the goal are effectively weighted
to zero during the similarity comparisons. Although typ-
icality derives from the same comparison process for
common and ad hoc categories, fundamentally different
category concepts result in fundamentally different
forms of graded structure.
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Constructing Category Concepts for Ad Hoc Categories
Perhaps one of the most difficult problems regarding
ad hoc categories is explaining how goals make particular
ad hoc categories relevant. In the previous section, I
assumed that the concepts for these categories contain
properties relevant to the goals these categories serve.
But, given a goal, how can we predict which properties
should be activated and associated to each other to form
the concept for an ad hoc category? The solution to this
problem will most likely need to be developed in the
context of a theory of problem solving.
A more tractable problem is discovering how new
concepts can be constructed to represent ad hoc cate-
gories. One way is to retrieve well established concepts
and alter them by adding or deleting properties. In
finding furniture for an office, "desk" and "lamp" may
become "desk with a large surface" and "lamp that has
adjustable positions and provides bright light." Adding
properties was observed in Experiment 4 when subjects
provided highly specific labels for common category
item sets instead of using the one-word labels. Properties
can also be deleted from concepts when contrary to cur-
rent goals. A dieter might order a "salad without dress-
ing," or someone who likes to work on furniture might
buy an "unupholstered sofa."
Novel concepts can also be constructed from prop-
erty information in memory. Any property, X, can be
used to construct the category of "things possessing X."
For example, the property of "flammable" could be
used to represent the category of "things that are flam-
mable" for someone trying to prevent fires. Such concepts
may also contain sets of properties (e.g., things that are
flammable and near a heat source). Sets of properties
can be organized as conjunctions (e.g., expensive and
unusual), as disjunctions (e.g., expensive or unusual), or
as combinations of other forms.
Once a new concept has been constructed, it may be
reconstructed on subsequent occasions if it continues to
be relevant. Such reconstructions may cause the concept
to become well established in memory. The associations
between its properties (if there are more than one) may
become stronger, and its overall accessibility may
become higher.
Exemplar Production from Ad Hoc Categories
Once a concept has been constructed or retrieved,
it can be used as a cue to retrieve category instances.
For a category well established in memory, direct asso-
ciations from its category concept to its category mem-
bers are activated, thus activating the concepts for these
members. But for categories not well established in
memory, there are no well established concept-to-
instance associations that serve this purpose. How, then,
do people retrieve exemplars from ad hoc categories?
One possibility is that they use a generate-test proce-
dure. The associative structure of related, well estab-
lished categories may be used to generate possible
instances of a poorly established category. As each item
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is retrieved, it is then tested for membership in the
poorly established category. To find instances of "res-
taurants to watch a sunset in," instances from well
established restaurant categories could be retrieved (e. g.,
local Indian restaurants, local seafood restaurants). Each
instance would then be checked for properties such as
"has a western exposure," "has large windows," and
"has an unobstructed view." Instances having these prop-
erties become members of the category, and instances not
having them become members of its complement.
As a category becomes frequently instantiated using a
generate-test procedure, direct associations should
become well established between the category concept
and its instances. This change in category representa-
tion would eventually make the generate-test proce-
dure unnecessary, since the more efficient lookup pro-
cedure could now operate.
Cross-Classification into Ad Hoc Categories
Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braern
(1976) argue that people prefer to classify entities
initially with basic category names. For example, people
prefer to call an inanimate object with four legs, a seat,
and a back in a particular configuration a "chair" as
opposed to an "office chair" or "furniture." Given this
initial classification, however, there are numerous ways
an entity can be cross-classified during subsequent classi-
fications that serve particular goals. For example, a chair
could subsequently be classified into "things that can
be used for emergency firewood," "things that can be
stood on," "gifts," and so on, depending on the current
goal of the perceiver. An outline of a cross-classification
model was sketched in the discussion of Experiment 4.
How well someone can generate secondary cross-
classifications appears to vary substantially. In fact,
the ability to do this well has often been considered
a sign of creative ability. In the Unusual Uses Test
(Cronbach, 1970), subjects are given the name of an
entity and asked to generate as many uses of it as they
can think of, each of which can be considered a cross-
classification. The more cross-classifications a person
generates, and the more novel these classifications are,
the more creative the person is assessed as being.
In general, the construction and use of ad hoc cate-
gories appear to reflect creative aspects of human intelli-
gence. Similar to the ability to cross-classify, the abilities
to construct new concepts instrumental to achieving
goals and to retrieve instances of these concepts without
direct concept-to-instance associations are creative pro-
cesses. All three enable the construction of new repre-
sentations, each representation reflecting a new way of
organizing the environment. Perceiving these new organi-
zations may be necessary to achieving new goals or to
approaching old ones in novel ways. Once an ad hoc tax-
onomy has been constructed, further use may cause it to
become well established in memory. Understanding the
construction, use, and establishment of ad hoc categories
may not only turn out to be informative about human
intelligence, understanding these processes may be cen-
tral to it.
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NOTES
1. Let p, defined as the average proportion of items circled
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per item set, represent the probability of a subject's circling an
item while guessing. Then if n is the number of subjects in the
experiment, pn is the number of subjects circling a given item
and (1 - p)n is the number of subjects not circling the item.
Agreement for the item, as defined in the text, is thenl(+l)pn+
(-1)(1 - p)nl/n, which is 2p - 1. Averaging across items and
item sets results in an overall agreement score for the experiment
of 2p - 1. Given that p in Experiment 1 was .52 (i.e., the aver-
age number of items circled per set, 3.15, divided by the number
of items in a set, 6), then overall agreement should be .04 if sub-
jects were guessing.
2. It should be noted that the unclear cases observed in these
categories were unclear in the sense that some subjects thought
these items were category members and other subjects did not.
As noted by McCloskey and Glucksberg (1978), such cases are
not necessarily unclear. They could falsely appear to be unclear
because some subjects' definitions of a category include these
items as category members, whereas other subjects' slightly dif-
ferent definitions do not. Most important, classifying these
instances may be completely clear (as opposed to unclear) for all
subjects. Given the presence of typicality gradients in these cate-
gories, however, it is likely that the unclear cases in this experi-
ment really were items subjects were uncertain about. If sub-
jects show decreasing confidence in the membership of clear
category members, which they did, it is reasonable to believe
their confidence would decrease to the point of being uncer-
tain about the membership of unclear cases.
3. That subjects ably discriminate ad hoc categories is corro-
borated by tile following demonstration. Six subjects generated
four exemplars to each of the eight ad hoc categories used in
Experiment 1. Four judges examined each of the 192 exemplars
generated as to whether they were valid members of their respec-
tive categories. Three judges accepted all 192 exemplars as
valid, and one judge accepted all but 4. Thus there appears to be
substantial agreement on membership in ad hoc categories.
4. It was impossible to compute item averages for the random
category intrusion data since it was not clear to which category a
given intrusion belonged. Therefore, the one-way ANOVA for
the intrusion frequencies was performed only across subjects.
5. Since number of correct exemplars retrieved and number
of intrusions were both higher for common than for ad hoc cate-
gories, one could argue that common categories are not superior
mnemonic devices. However, the total increase during free recall
in the number of correct exemplars from ad hoc to common
categories was 7.68, whereas the total increase in the number of
intrusions was only 1.50. For cued recall, the increase in cor-
rect exemplars was 6.72, whereas the increase in intrusions was
2.06. The much larger increases for correct exemplars indicate
that common categories do indeed make superior mnemonic
devices.
6. The categories are "insects" and "things that have a
smell," respectively.
7. The minimum increased as the number of labels for a set
decreased. However, this worked against the hypothesis that
there would be a context effect, since the no-context sets usually
had fewer labels than the context sets.
(Manuscript received for publication March 26, 1982;
revision accepted February 7,1983.)
